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The appeals process – whereby the losing party of an administrative or judicial decision can 
seek reconsideration of their arguments before a higher institution – is an important 
mechanism to correct legal errors and to improve existing laws and regulations. We use data 
of 467 firm groups that participated in 88 cartels convicted by the European Commission 
between 2000 and 2012 to study both the characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and 
the factors that determine their successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying discrete 
choice models and a two-stage hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics – such 
as the size and financial condition of the firm group or the clarity of fine guidelines – only 
affect the probability to file an appeal, other factors such as the size of the fine imposed in 
connection to characteristics as ringleader, repeat offender or leniency applicant influence 
both the probability and the success of an appeal. We take our empirical results to derive 
conclusions for both firms and public policy makers.   
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The implementation and continuous improvement of a workable and efficient judicial system 
is of fundamental importance at the constitutional level of any modern society. Independent of 
the underlying tradition or philosophy – such as the ‘rule of law’ in the ancient Greek or 
Anglo-Saxon tradition or the ‘state of law’ in the more continental European legal thinking – 
the judicial system is always viewed as an important constitutional cornerstone focusing on 
the interpretation and application of the law in the name of the state.    
 Although the workability and efficiency of the judicial system depends on various factors 
such as its explicit design or the availability of sufficient financial resources provided by the 
state, it appears inevitable that even the most efficient judicial system is not immune against 
the occurrence of erroneous court decisions. As a direct consequence, it is considered a 
constitutional (or even human) right of the losing party to seek reconsideration of their 
arguments as part of an appeals process – possibly leading to a diverging decision by an 
appellate court. 
 Complementary to this important function as means of error correction, the appeals process 
also contributes substantially to the improvement of existing laws and regulations: first, 
because lower court decisions are reviewed by experienced higher courts (thereby 
contributing to the extension of high-quality case law) and, second, because the frequent 
occurrence of appeals cases as such provide signals to public policy makers on the 
(suboptimal) efficiency of existing laws and regulations (thereby initiating, e.g., the 
publication of guidelines or even the revision of the respective law or regulation). In that 
sense the appeals process also contributes to the avoidance of erroneous future decisions. 
 Given this substantial importance of the appeals process for any judicial system, it comes 
as a surprise that existing empirical research on these processes is rare. This is particularly the 
case for studies that aim at investigating and evaluating entire appeals processes. In this 
respect, especially two types of empirical questions are particularly relevant. First, out of the 
group of convicted parties for a certain infringement or felony, which parties are more likely 
to file an appeal? Second, out of the sub-sample of parties who decided to file an appeal, what 
are the characteristics of successful appellants (and how successful are they)? Answers to both 
types of questions must be considered as valuable information for public policy makers. For 
example, if it is found that small firms are either less likely to appeal and/or less successful in 
appealing, public policy makers could closer investigate the reasons for these asymmetries 
(e.g., the impossibility to bear the respective costs or a restricted access to experienced 
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lawyers) and (possibly) decide to implement measures to mitigate the problem (e.g., through 
the provision of low-priced credits or legal consulting services for small firms).  
 Against this background, we use data of 467 firm groups1 that participated in 88 cartels 
convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to study both the 
characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and the factors that determine their 
successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying discrete choice models and a two-stage 
hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics – such as the size and financial 
condition of the firm group or the clarity of fine guidelines – only affect the probability to file 
an appeal, other factors such as the size of the fine imposed in connection to characteristics as 
ringleader, repeat offender or leniency applicant influence both the probability and the success 
of an appeal. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms and public 
policy makers. 
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The following second section 
provides a brief characterization of the appeals process in general and gives an overview of 
existing theoretical and empirical research. Subsequently, the third section continues with a 
brief description of the appeals process in European cartel cases followed by the development 
of an empirical framework to assess this specific appeals process in the fourth section. In the 
fifth section, we present our empirical analysis. While Section 5.1 characterizes our empirical 
estimation strategy, the subsequent Section 5.2 describes the construction of the data set and 
presents the corresponding descriptive statistics. Section 5.3 then follows with a presentation 
and discussion of our estimation results before Section 5.4 closes the fifth section with the 
derivation of several implications for both firms and public policy makers. The sixth section 
concludes the article by summarizing its main results and providing several avenues for future 
research.  
 
2. The appeals process  
It is reasonable to assume that any decision by a court (or public authority) is made under 
uncertainty with both sides presenting their best cases and the court finally rendering a 
decision in favor of one side or the other. According to Miceli ((2009), p. 259), the best the 
court will be able to do is ‘… to assess a probability that each side’s version of the facts is 
true’. In rendering a decision, the court is typically also committed to interpret existing laws 
and regulations as these are often – by construction – not deterministic but leave (at least) 
some discretion to the court.  
                                                          
1  Firms within one group are linked through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines. 
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 The appeals process offers the losing party the possibility to seek reconsideration of their 
arguments – possibly leading to a diverging decision by an appellate court.2 Without denying 
its important constitutional role or possibly even status as a human right (see, e.g., Nobles and 
Schiff (2002)), we will assume in the following that the implementation of an appeals process 
is motivated by two main goals. First, appeals help to refine existing laws and regulations; not 
only by assessments of experienced appellate courts enriching existing case law (and guiding 
lower courts in future decisions) but also by providing signals to lawmakers on the efficiency 
of existing laws and regulations (see, e.g., Cooter and Ulen (2000)). If, for example, the 
application of a certain law or regulation is frequently followed by an unusually large amount 
of appeals, a publication of guidelines or even a revision of the respective provision is 
suggested to increase procedural efficiency.   
 Second, the implementation of an appeals process aims at reducing the occurrence of legal 
errors. According to Shavell (1995), the appeals process can be viewed as a tool to correct 
errors because, first, parties are more likely to file an appeal if the first decision was erroneous 
(i.e., the act of initiating a (costly) appeal provides additional information on the (increased) 
likelihood of an erroneous decision). Second, the existence of an appeals process provides 
incentives to lower court judges to avoid erroneous decisions in the first place; basically 
because they become aware that errors may be uncovered by the higher court as part of an 
appeal thereby damaging their reputation and career prospects (see, e.g., Shavell (2006), Levy 
(2005) or Chopard et al. (2014)).      
 Given these key motivations for the implementation of an appeals process, its actual design 
offers various degrees of freedom. In addition to rather general questions such as, first, who 
should have the right to initiate an appeal (e.g., the litigants themselves and/or the appellate 
court) and, second, in what time period after the initial court decision may an appeal be 
initiated, more specific questions include, third, whether the respective appellate court is 
committed to accept the case for investigation (an appeal ‘as of right’) or whether it can reject 
it (as part of a ‘discretionary review’; see Cooter and Ulen (2000), p. 418); fourth, whether it 
                                                          
2  From a law perspective, it is important to differentiate between the appeals process and the judicial review 
process (see, e.g., Schweitzer (2013) for a discussion of the latter with respect to EU competition law). 
Technically, the appeals process focuses on decisions by lower courts who are reassessed by higher courts on 
the merits of the decision under appeal while the judicial review process concentrates on assessments of 
decisions by a public authority (e.g., the European Commission or a national competition authority) by one or 
two court levels who will focus on the legality of the decision under review only. While important from a 
legal perspective, the economic implications of a differentiation between both processes must be considered 
as rather minor thereby justifying our approach to simply use the term ‘appeals process’ in the remainder of 
this article. In this respect, it is interesting to add that appeals mechanisms are also used in much wider 
contexts such as religious bodies, commercial trade organizations or professional sports leagues (see Shavell 
(1995), p. 380) thereby increasing the relevance of our empirical analysis further. 
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has to make an entirely new judgment on the case (‘de novo appeals’) or is restricted to a 
review of the old decision based on either ‘facts and law’ or ‘law only’ as part of the appeals 
process; or, fifth, whether the decision of the first-stage appellate court is final or could be 
challenged by a second-stage appellate court (the so-called ‘finality decision’)?   
 Although it is above the scope of this article to provide a full review of answers given by 
various theoretical research articles (see generally Shavell (1995, 2010) or more specifically 
Daughety and Reinganum (2000)), it appears straightforward that an answer to the question of 
an optimal design of an appeals process depends on a detailed assessment of the (incremental) 
costs and benefits of various alternative designs.3 In this respect, for example, Shavell (1995) 
argues that – due to convex costs of avoiding legal errors – it is socially preferable to have a 
two-stage (less accurate) appeals process rather than a one-stage (more accurate) process. 
Furthermore, in an older contribution, Martineau (1984) questions the assumption that appeals 
always follow welfare-enhancing motivations and signal an increased likelihood of an 
erroneous decision. He argues that appeals may also be initiated for frivolous reasons; i.e., 
parties file (and/or delay) appeals for tactical reasons and not because they believe that the 
decision is actually erroneous. Due to the substantial societal costs that are created by such 
forms of abusive behavior – such as, e.g., delays in decision making at the appellate court 
level – he suggests to impose sanctions on frivolous appeals in order to ‘… protect both 
litigants and the ability of the federal appellate courts to decide cases in an expeditious and 
fair manner’ (Martineau (1984), p. 845). 
 Compared to the larger theoretical literature, the number of empirical contributions on the 
appeals process is rather small and fragmented. While a very limited number of studies focus 
on assessments of the determinants of filing an appeal (see especially Santolino (2010)), 
several other studies aim at answering the question why plaintiffs lose appeals (see, e.g., 
Clermont and Eisenberg (2001) and Eisenberg and Farber (2014)). For European competition 
policy, Günster et al. (2010) provide an empirical analysis of all European Court of Appeal 
Rulings of horizontal, vertical, abuse of dominance, licensing as well as joint ventures cases 
between 1957 and 2004. They find, inter alia, that the number of pleas positively (negatively) 
influences the probability of receiving partial (complete) annulment and that cases with a high 
number of judges are more likely to result in a complete annulment. In addition, they show 
that the probability of filing an appeal is significantly influenced by the length of the 
Commission decision, the number of accepted complaints, the number of judges and whether 
                                                          
3  In the words of Shavell (1995, 386) it is socially desirable to invest further in the accuracy of the appeals 
process until “… the increase in costs is outweighed by the increase in the expected gain, that is, the increase 
in the probability of reversal of error multiplied by the social harm from error”. 
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the case is grouped into one case or not. In a related paper, Carree et al. (2010) empirically 
investigate determinants of appealing EC decisions on case and firm level using a similar 
dataset. They identify the level of fine, the decision length and the number of parties to which 
the decision is addressed as significant drivers of the decision to file an appeal. 
 Against this background, we aim to contribute to this literature by developing an empirical 
framework for the study of the appeals process and subsequently applying it to European 
cartel cases. Although any empirical analysis of an appeals process has to take the 
specificities of the process under investigation into account, our two key research questions – 
and the corresponding empirical framework – are of general relevance for the study and 
evaluation of appeals processes: First, how do the characteristics of appellants differ from the 
characteristics of non-appellants? Second, out of the sub-sample of appellants, what factors 
drive their successfulness in the appeals process? Answers to both questions are especially 
important as part of an evaluation of the appeals process and the corresponding identification 
of improvement potential.        
  
3. The appeals process in European cartel cases 
Given the various alternative structures of an appeals process sketched in the previous section, 
it becomes apparent that any meaningful empirical analysis has to be based on a detailed 
characterization of the specific appeals process under investigation. Under EU competition 
law in general and for EC cartel cases in particular, the appellate court proceedings can be 
either one- or two-stage. At the first stage, a cartel member that believes to have serious 
concerns with a (fining) decision of the EC can file an appeal with the General Court (GC) of 
the European Union.4 The GC – previously known as the Court of First Instance (CFI) – is 
composed of at least one judge from each member state. According to Article 254 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), judges are appointed ‘by common 
accord of the governments of the member states’ for a renewable term of six years. The GC 
sits in chambers of usually three or five judges. Substantively, four main categories of 
argument can broadly be distinguished in an appeal against an EC cartel decision: fine levels, 
procedural aspects, facts/standard of proof aspects, and substantive assessment issues.5 In any 
case, the first-stage appeal must be initiated within two months of the earlier; either the 
                                                          
4  See the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2010/C 177/02. 
5  According to Camesasca et al. (2013), appeals against cartel decisions often aim at obtaining a fine reduction 
rather than an annulment of the fine (basically because it is rather unlikely that a firm was wrongly convicted 
for its participation in a cartel by the EC). 
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publication of the Commission’s decision or the notification of the firm group (Art. 263 
TFEU). 
 Generally, the GC not only has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by 
the EC; it also has full jurisdiction to review the entire Commission decision (including a 
repetition of the full assessment process). In practice, however, the GC usually focuses on an 
assessment of the factors linked to the correct application of the respective law provisions 
such as cartel duration, the gravity of the infringement or the application of the leniency 
program (see Geradin and Henry (2005) or Harding and Gibbs (2005)). Typically, the GC 
does not aim at replacing the Commission’s assessment of evidence with its own. 
 At the second stage of the appeals process in EC cartel cases, judgments of the GC can be 
appealed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the unsuccessful party, i.e., either the 
convicted firm, the EC itself or both. The ECJ is the highest European appellate court and also 
has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by the GC. However, in its 
proceedings, it limits itself to questions of law and has no jurisdiction to (re-)review the facts 
and analyze the evidence that the GC used to support its findings and decision.  
  
4. An empirical framework to assess the appeals process in European cartel cases   
Following a general description of the appeals process and its practical implementation in 
European cartel cases, in this section, we continue with the development of an empirical 
framework to assess the appeals process in European cartel cases. The structure of the (more 
generally applicable) framework is guided by our two main research questions. At the first 
stage – ‘assessing the characteristics of appellants’ – we will motivate the potential relevance 
of various determinants of the decision to file an appeal against a cartel decision by the EC or 
the GC. At the second stage of the framework – ‘assessing the characteristics of successful 
appellants’ – we will restrict ourselves to the sub-sample of firm groups that decided to file an 
appeal and aim at isolating key characteristics of successful appellants in connection to the 
level of success (i.e., the degree of fine reduction reached).    
 
4.1. Stage 1: Assessing the characteristics of appellants 
The first stage of our framework focuses on the characteristics of firm groups that decided to 
file an appeal against a cartel decision by the European Commission. Although on the surface 
one might argue that the existence of one or more alleged errors in the EC decision is the key 
(and only) driver of firms to file an appeal, our discussion in Section 2 above has revealed that 
other purposes such as so-called frivolous appeals (aiming at, e.g., delaying fine payments or 
7 
 
reaching some fine reduction) must be considered as well. In the following, we will subdivide 
our assessment of potential drivers into three groups of variables: group-related, fine-related 
and legal environment-related.  
 
Group-related variables 
Within the group-related variables, we expect that the characteristic of especially four 
variables have a significant influence on the probability to appeal: (1) the number of firms in 
the group, (2) the number of different countries in the group, (3) the number of firm group 
employees and (4) the financial condition of the firms in the group. First, the larger the 
number of firms in one group, the more likely it becomes that at least one of the respective 
firms identifies a reason to file an appeal (be it either alleged errors in the decision or other 
(tactical) motives). Second, the larger the number of countries in one firm group, the higher 
the expected heterogeneity among firms (e.g., due to (partly) diverging laws and regulations) 
and the more likely that at least one firm decides to appeal.  
 Third, we have included the number of employees as proxy for the size of the respective 
firm group. Ceteris paribus, we expect that the probability to file an appeal increases with 
group size for basically two reasons. On the one hand, larger firms have better possibilities to 
file appeals as they have the necessary (financial and) human resources in the form of, e.g., 
professional and experienced in-house lawyers. On the other hand, larger firms are more 
likely to have larger incentives to appeal an EC cartel decision, e.g., in order to reduce the 
negative publicity that is associated to it.  
 Last but not least, we expect that the probability of filing an appeal is also influenced by 
the financial condition of the respective firm groups. While a financially healthy firm may 
decide to pay the fine thereby terminating the respective resource-intensive trial, a financially 
weak firm may be forced to file an appeal in order to avoid immediate fine payments after the 
EC decision has become final. We therefore expect that firms in financial trouble have an 
elevated probability to file an appeal.  
 
Fine-related variables 
Turning from group- to fine-related variables, we expect that the characteristic of especially 
five (groups of) variables significantly influence the probability to appeal: (1) aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, (2) the duration of the cartel agreement, (3) the absolute size of the 
final fine, (4) characteristic as ringleader or repeat offender and (5) the use of a leniency 
program as either the first reporting firm or a follower. First, the presence of aggravating or 
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mitigating circumstances6 – identified by the EC during their case assessment – is translated 
into either an increase or a decrease of the respective basic amount of the fine. As the fixing 
of both types of fine adjustments is rather arbitrary and implemented by the Commission 
using its discretionary power, it becomes more likely for firm groups to appeal a decision as 
soon as these adjustments have played a role in an EC decision.   
 Second, the duration of cartel participation must be considered as a further possible driver 
of the probability to appeal. The longer the group participated in the cartel, the more 
complicated it becomes for the EC to collect all necessary information to decide on, e.g., the 
exact start date of cartel participation thereby increasing the probability that the firm group 
disagrees with the respective authority finding and decides to appeal. Third, the size of the 
final fine must be considered as another, rather obvious, driver of the probability to appeal. 
The larger the fine, the more drastic are the consequences for the respective firms with respect 
to both share- and stakeholder groups and the larger therefore the desire to at least reduce the 
fine through a successful appeal.  
 Fourth, the characteristics as ringleader or repeat offender may also have a presumably 
negative effect on the probability to appeal, basically because both ringleaders and repeat 
offenders have a rather difficult standing at the EC and this, ceteris paribus, reduces the 
probability to file an appeal. Last but not least, the application of a leniency program – be it as 
first reporting firm or follower – may have an influence on the probability to file an appeal. 
Due to the fact that leniency applicants have to fully cooperate with the EC in order to qualify 
for a fine reduction or even fine waiver, the EC can base its fining decision on detailed 
documentation thereby reducing the probability of error. We therefore expect that the 
characteristic as leniency applicant reduces the probability to file an appeal. As the first self-
reporting firm typically receives the largest fine reduction, we expect the negative influence 
on the probability to file an appeal to be stronger for those firms than for the group of 
followers (who receive smaller fine reductions).  
 
Legal environment-related variables 
We further argue that several legal environment-related variables are likely to influence a 
firm’s probability to appeal an EC cartel decision. The legal environment is taken into account 
by means of two (groups of) variables capturing (1) the legal basis under which a firm was 
                                                          
6  Aggravating circumstances considered by the EC are, e.g., repeat offences, refusal to cooperate with the EC 
or the role of leader in an infringement. Mitigating circumstances, however, include, e.g., the provision of 
evidence that the infringement was terminated as soon as the EC intervened or proof that the anti-competitive 
conduct has been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or by legislation. 
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fined as well as (2) the state of private enforcement in the jurisdiction in which the firm is 
located. Precisely, we expect that the publication of a revised EC Leniency Notice in 2002 
and revised EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines in 2006 – which specified the 
granting of leniency discounts and the fine calculation process, respectively – have increased 
the transparency of EC decisions thereby reducing the probability to file an appeal.  
 Furthermore, the threat of a strengthened private antitrust enforcement through cartel 
damage claims by harmed customers of cartel members may cause elevated incentives to file 
an appeal as the beginning of such (typically follow-on) private suits is postponed. However, 
as the private enforcement of competition law – at least in terms of cartel damage claims – is 
a rather recent development in most European countries, we expect that US based firms are 
more likely to appeal (due to the substantially higher risk of private damage claims). 
Furthermore, as the UK appears to be the most advanced country in the EU when it comes to 
damages-related private antitrust enforcement, we will also investigate whether firm groups 
stemming from the UK have elevated incentives to file an appeal.      
 
4.2. Stage 2: Assessing the characteristics of successful appellants 
At the second stage of our empirical framework, we investigate the determinants of successful 
appeals in connection to the level of success for the sub-sample of those firm groups that 
decided to file an appeal. The separation into ‘drivers of the probability of success’ and 
‘drivers of the level of success’ appears to be especially important as the success spectrum in 
cartel appeals cases can be very broad reaching from a one percent fine reduction up to a 
complete fine waiver. Taking this characteristic into account, in a first step, we discuss a set 
of variables that are believed to influence either only the probability of a successful appeal or 
both the probability and level of success.7 In a second step, we concentrate on variables that 
are likely to influence the level of success only (but not the probability of success).  
 
Variables affecting the appellant’s success probability in connection to the level of success  
Starting off with the first group of variables, we expect that the characteristics of especially 
six (groups of) variables significantly influence the appellant’s success probability in 
connection to the level of success: (1) the number of pleas, (2) the number of appellants 
within one group joining the appeal(s), (3) the number of leniency applicants within one 
group, (4) the fact whether an appeals decision has been challenged (either by the respective 
                                                          
7  We define an appeal as successful if one or more members of a specific firm group received a fine reduction 
or fine annulment after the GC or the ECJ reviewed the EC decision. 
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firm group or the EC), (5) the time span between the beginning and the end of an EC 
investigation and the time span between the cartel breakdown and the beginning of the EC 
investigation, and (6) the publication of leniency and fine guidelines.       
 First, we expect that the number of different reasons raised by the group in the appeal(s) is 
a key determinant of both the success as such and the level of success. The larger the selection 
of reasons raised, the more likely it becomes that at least one reason is found to have 
substance. Furthermore, the more reasons are raised, the more likely it becomes that the 
decision is increasingly erroneous.  
 Second, the larger the number of appellants within one group that participate in the 
appeal(s), the more likely it becomes that the decision for at least one firm was erroneous and 
the appeal therefore is successful. Third, the larger the number of leniency applicants among 
the firms in one group, the better is the information situation of the EC regarding these firms 
and the lower the probability that an appeal will be successful. If, however, an alleged error 
has occurred (e.g., because the respective firms (rightfully) expected a larger reduction of the 
fine), it is likely that such an error is rather minor thereby leading to smaller reductions in the 
fine.     
 Fourth, as some appeals decided by the GC were challenged again either by a firm group 
or the EC, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of success crucially depends on who 
lost at the first-stage appellate court. We expect that the probability for an eventually 
successful appeal increases in case the EC appealed (as this suggests that the GC was in favor 
of the group) and decreases in case the group challenged the first-round judgment (as this 
suggests that the GC (at least partly) rejected the appeal). However, it appears unlikely that 
the level of fine reduction depends on the fact whether a second round is reached or not as 
both the GC and the ECJ base their decisions (of different scopes) on case-related facts as 
well as the same legal basis.   
 Fifth, the duration of investigation and the duration of detection (i.e., the time span 
between cartel breakdown and beginning of the investigation) both refer to the work 
environment at the EC and the related probability for erroneous decisions. Ceteris paribus, the 
quicker the decision by the EC, the more likely that facts were either ignored or inaccurately 
reviewed leading to a higher probability of a successful appeal. Furthermore, the larger the 
time distance from the end of the cartel agreement to the detection of the cartel, the more 
likely it becomes that the Commission’s case is built on weaker evidence also increasing the 
probability of a successful appeal.   
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   Sixth, we expect that the publication of a revised EC Leniency Notice in 2002 and revised 
EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines in 2006 led to increases in the transparency of 
EC decisions suggesting a reduced probability of a successful appeal and a smaller fine 
reduction in cases in which the appeal was nevertheless successful.   
 
Variables affecting the appellant’s level of success only  
Following our discussion of the first set of variables – those that influence either only the 
probability of a successful appeal or both the probability and level of success – we now turn 
to variables that are likely to influence the level of success only. In particular, we discuss the 
following four (groups of) variables: (1) fine annulment, (2) final fine, (3) characteristic as 
ringleader or repeat offender, and (4) reasons for a successful appeal. 
 First, we expect that firm groups demanding a complete annulment of the fine are likely to 
receive greater fine reductions than other firm groups.8 A key reason for such a relationship 
can be seen in the fact that appeals demanding an annulment are likely to have more 
substance than claims that only demand a reduction in the fine. Second, it is reasonable to 
expect that the higher the final fine, the larger is the absolute reduction of the fine basically 
because there is simply more potential for substantial fine reductions.  
 Third, following our argumentation above we expect that both ringleaders and repeat 
offenders have a rather difficult standing at both the EC and the appellate courts resulting in 
comparatively lower reductions when the courts make use of their discretionary power during 
the evaluation process of the pleas. Fourth, the key drivers of the level of success of an appeal 
must be seen in the different reasons that either the GC or the ECJ accepts in their decisions 
as justified. In addition to errors in the substantive analysis, also errors in the application of 
the leniency program or the fine calculation as such may justify fine reductions. Furthermore, 
it can also be the case that two or more types of errors are found. Although such a situation 
may on the surface speak for a higher fine reduction than in cases in which only one type of 
error was present, a strong case based on a single reason may still lead to a higher fine 
reduction than a selection of weaker reasons. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we present our empirical analysis. While Section 5.1 characterizes our 
empirical estimation strategy, the subsequent Section 5.2 describes the construction of the 
                                                          
8  Although most groups demand a fine annulment in their appeal (as also reflected in the descriptive statistics 
discussed below), they regularly claim a fine reduction in case the fine annulment is rejected by the GC/ECJ. 
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data set and presents the corresponding descriptive statistics. Section 5.3 then follows with a 
presentation and discussion of our estimation results before Section 5.4 closes the fifth section 
with the derivation of several implications for public policy makers. 
 
5.1. Estimation strategy 
We estimate two different model specifications in order to investigate, at the first stage, the 
characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal (‘the characteristics of appellants’) and, at the 
second stage, the factors that determine their successfulness in terms of fine reduction (‘the 
characteristics of successful appellants’).  
 
5.1.1. Stage 1: Assessing the characteristics of appellants 
With respect to our first research question, the derivation of several hypotheses in Section 4.1 
above suggests the specification of the following econometric model: 
Stage 1: 
ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ ൌ 1|࢞ሻ ൌ ܨሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵᇱܩݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚଶᇱܨ݅݊݁ ൅ ߚଷᇱܮ݈݁݃ܽሻ              
with ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ ൌ 1|࢞ሻ  indicating the response probability of a group to appeal the EC 
decision on the cartel case in which the group was involved, and ࢞  denoting the set of 
explanatory variables that determine a groups’ decision to appeal (consisting of the three 
parameter vectors Group, Fine and Legal).  
 The vector ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ captures firm group-related variables and consists of the number of 
firms (No_firms) and the number of different countries (No_countries) within the underlying 
firm group. In the standard version of the model the vector merely consists of these two 
variables as information on them is available for all groups in the sample. In a second, 
extended version, the vector additionally contains the number of employees (No_employees) 
as well as the liquid ratio (i.e., the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities) of a group in 
the year of the EC decision (Liquidratio) as potential drivers of the decision to file an appeal. 
This information, however, is only available for 58 percent of the groups resulting in a 
substantially smaller sample size available for the econometric analysis.9  
 The vector ܨ݅݊݁ contains eight variables referring to specific factors taken into account by 
the EC during the fine calculation process (for a group). These are binary variables capturing 
whether aggravating (Aggrav_circ) and/or mitigating (Mitig_circ) circumstances existed, 
whether the group took the position as ringleader in the cartel (Ringleader) and whether it has 
                                                          
9  The ‘number of employees’ / ‘liquid ratio’ of one firm group was calculated as ‘the sum of the number of 
employees’ / ‘the average liquid ratio’ of all distinct firms in the group. Please note that in some cases 
observations for particularly smaller firms were not available.  
13 
 
infringed anti-cartel laws before (Repeat_offender).10 In addition, the vector controls for the 
duration in which the group actively participated in the cartel (Duration_participation) as 
well as the final fine imposed by the EC (Final_fine). Last but not least, the binary variables 
LP_first and LP_follower are part of the vector in order to take into account whether the 
group successfully applied for leniency either as the first firm or as a follower.   
 Finally, the vector ܮ݈݁݃ܽ  controls for the legal environment under which a group was 
convicted and consists of four binary variables capturing whether a group was fined under the 
2006 EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines (Fine_guidelines_06), under the 2002 
Leniency Notice (Leniency_notice_02) and whether the group is located in a country with 
effective private enforcement (US and UK). The reference groups for the former two binary 
variables are groups convicted under the 1998 Fine Guidelines or the 1996 Leniency Notice 
while the reference groups for the latter variables consist of groups not located in the US or 
the UK, respectively.  
 Since the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if a group appealed the EC 
decision, we use Probit and Logit models for binary response. Both discrete choice models are 
based on Maximum Likelihood estimations and only differ with respect to the underlying 
functional form F(.). Whereas F(.) represents the standard normal distribution in the Probit 
model, F(.) follows a logistic function in the Logit model. 
 
5.1.2. Stage 2: Assessing the characteristics of successful appellants 
Turning to our second research question – assessing the characteristics of successful 
appellants – our hypotheses derived in Section 4.2 above suggest the use a two-stage hurdle 
model suggested by Cragg (1971). This type of model represents an alternative to the classical 
Tobit model for corner solution outcomes. Our variable of interest is the level of discount 
granted to firm groups that appealed EC cartel decisions. This variable contains a substantial 
fraction of zero values in cases in which the GC or the ECJ rejected the pleas initiated by the 
appellants, however, is continuously distributed if the appeals were successful. As a 
consequence, the Tobit model appears to be the appropriate choice in explaining the level of 
fine discounts. A drawback of the Tobit model, however, is that it requires the same set of 
parameters to influence both the probability of receiving a fine discount (i.e., the probability 
of a successful appeal) and the level of fine reduction granted in case of a successful appeal. 
This also implies that, by construction, the sign of an explanatory variable is identical for 
                                                          
10  Since we explicitly control for both ringleader and repeat offender characteristics of a group, the variable 




determining the probability of a positive outcome and the actual outcome (given that it is 
positive) which can be a critical assumption for answering our second research question.  
 The two-stage hurdle model overcomes both obstacles by using two distinct estimation 
processes thereby permitting different signs on both stages and allowing different sets of 
explanatory variables to determine the probability of a positive value of the dependent 
variable and the actual value given that it is positive (see also Burke, 2009). In our case, this is 
an important advantage of the hurdle model over the Tobit model as both its assumptions are 
likely to be inappropriate.11 
 Econometrically, the hurdle model is implemented by using a Probit model at the first 
stage and a truncated normal model for all positive values at the second stage. Compared to 
the estimation of the model at stage 1, the data set is restricted to only those firm groups that 
appealed the EC decisions. The regression functions on both stages can be specified as 
follows: 
Stage 2a: 
ܲሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0|࢞૚ሻ ൌ ܨሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋_݌݈݁ܽݏ ൅ ߚଶܰ݋_ܽ݌݌݈݈݁ܽ݊ݐݏ ൅ ߚଷܶݓ݋ݏݐܽ݃݁_݁ܿ 
൅ߚସܶݓ݋ݏݐܽ݃݁_݂݅ݎ݉݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚହܰ݋_݈݁݊_ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽ݊ݐݏ 
൅ߚ଺ܨ݅݊݁_݃ݑ݈݅݀݁݅݊݁ݏ_06 ൅ ߚ଻ܮ݁݊݅݁݊ܿݕ_݊݋ݐ݅ܿ݁_02		 
൅ߚ଼ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊_݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଽܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊_݀݁ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ሻ              
Stage 2b: 
ܧሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ|ܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0, ࢞૛ሻ ൌ ܨሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋_݌݈݁ܽݏ ൅ ߚଶܰ݋_ܽ݌݌݈݈݁ܽ݊ݐݏ ൅ ߚଷܨ݅݊݁_ܽ݊݊ݑ݈݉݁݊ݐ 
൅ߚସܰ݋_݈݁݊_ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽ݊ݐݏ ൅ ߚହܨ݈݅݊ܽ_݂݅݊݁ ൅ ߚ଺ܴ݈݅݊݃݁ܽ݀݁ݎ 
	൅ߚ଻ܴ݁݌݁ܽݐ_݋݂݂݁݊݀݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଼ܨ݅݊݁_݃ݑ݈݅݀݁݅݊݁ݏ_06 
൅ߚଽܮ݁݊݅݁݊ܿݕ_݊݋ݐ݅ܿ݁_02 ൅ ߚଵ଴ᇱ ܵݑܿܿ݁ݏݏ_ݎ݁ܽݏ݋݊ݏሻ 
As shown by regression equations (2a) and (2b), we make use of the richer model 
specification possibilities provided by the hurdle model and use two different sets of 
parameters (x1 and x2) on both stages. Precisely, while some variables are included either in 
the first or the second stage estimation only, others emerge in both estimation equations. 
 Starting with variables explaining both the success probability of appeals (i.e., the 
probability of receiving a fine reduction) and the level of discounts (in case of success), we 
include the number of pleas brought forward (No_pleas), the number of appellants within one 
firm group (No_appelants), the number of leniency applicants within one group 
                                                          
11  For example, the requirement of the Tobit model to have the same sets of parameters on both stages of the 
model is misleading as the levels of fine reductions granted in successful appeals are likely to be strongly 
influenced by the underlying types of pleas accepted by the court (and these factors are only observable for 
firm groups whose appeals were successful). Hence, the Tobit model would be insufficiently specified to 
properly explain the level of fine reductions. 
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(No_len_applicants) as well as two binary variables capturing whether a group was fined 
under the revised EC Leniency Notice from 2002 (Leniency_notice_02) or under the revised 
EC Fine Guidelines from 2006 (Fine_guidelines_06) as explanatory variables.  
 Turning to variables that are only included in model (2a), we expect both the duration of 
investigation (Duration_investigation) and the duration of cartel detection 
(Duration_detection) to influence the probability of success. In addition, the two binary 
variables Twostage_ec and Twostage_firmgroup are included in order to control for the fact 
that some appeals (decided by the GC as first-stage appellate court) were challenged either by 
the EC or the respective firm group leading to a second investigation carried out by the ECJ. 
 Turning to variables only included in model (2b), we argue that the final fine imposed by 
the EC (Final_fine) and the characteristics as ringleader (Ringleader) or repeat offender  
(Repeat_offender) are determinants of the fine reduction of successful appeals. Furthermore, 
while the binary variable Fine_annulment captures whether a group demanded an annulment 
rather than a fine reduction in its appeal, the vector Success_reasons contains four binary 
variables representing different categories of reasons12 that were accepted by the courts as 
viable reasons to reduce the fine imposed by the EC or GC. 
 
5.2. Construction of the data set and descriptive statistics 
The raw data set used in this article contains information on all cartel and cartel appeals cases 
decided by the EC, the GC and the ECJ between 2000 and 2012. The data were collected from 
decisions and press releases published by the EC in the course of its investigations as well as 
from judgment documents provided by the online platform CVRIA.13 The data set combines 
case-related, firm group-related and firm-related information. Firm groups were formed 
according to the respective EC decisions, i.e., firms within one group are linked through 
ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines. For our empirical analysis we use the data on 
group level rather than on firm level because most variables do not substantially differ 
between single firms within one group. Using firm level data would therefore result in an 
unjustified multiplication of the sample size without providing additional information. The 
data set contains both firm groups that filed an appeal against their EC decisions and firm 
groups that decided not to appeal; however, the sample is restricted to those appeals for which 
the final decision of an appellate court was already available at the time of the finalization of 
                                                          
12  The different categories are (1) substantive reasons; (2) error in the application of leniency notice; (3) error in 
the fine calculation process after the basic amount of the fine was set; or (4) combinations of separate success 
reasons (‘multiple reasons’). The reference group of the success reason variables is ‘errors in the calculation 
of the basic amount of the fine’. 
13  See http://curia.europa.eu for further information. 
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the data set in February 2014. In addition to the information provided by the EC and CVRIA, 
we have also created two group-related variables (liquid ratio and number of employees) by 
adding the respective information from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
In total, the data set combines information on 467 firm-groups from 88 cartel cases.14 Table 1 
below shows the descriptive statistics of the data set while Table 4 in the Annex provides a 

























                                                          
14  It is worth noting that – for our empirical analysis – we divided some of the decided EC cartel cases into 
several separate cases, basically because some EC decisions cover several distinct cases within one judgment 
(e.g., as they either refer to similar product markets or the same product market in different geographical 
regions). The creation of such distinct cases is important in order to aggregate our group-related variables 
appropriately. The number of cartel cases included in our empirical analysis is 74 according to the EC 
statistics (rather than 88 according to our classification). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs. 
Appeals-related variables           
Appeal 0.5011 0.5005 0 1 467 
Appeal_success 0.4658 0.4999 0 1 234 
No_pleas 5.6 3.1945 1 20 234 
No_appellants 1.8632 1.3673 1 12 234 
Duration_decision 48.8752 13.7932 5 81 234 
Discount 8.3905 28.9366 0 233 234 
Fine_annulment 0.9231 0.267 0 1 234 
Twostage_ec 0.1068 0.3096 0 1 234 
Twostage_firmgroup 0.4103 0.4929 0 1 234 
Group-related variables           
No_firms 1.8779 1.3913 1 12 467 
No_countries 1.4904 0.9062 1 8 467 
No_len_applicants 1.2762 1.4747 0 12 467 
No_employees 49.0442 91.1542 0.002 515.063 272 
Liquidratio 1.6129 3.8127 0.08 55.6 272 
Fine-related variables           
Aggrav_circum 0.0428 0.2027 0 1 467 
Mitig_circum 0.1692 0.3753 0 1 467 
Duration_participation 83.1606 66.0333 3 419 467 
Final_Fine 31.1627 65.912 0 553 467 
Ringleader 0.0493 0.2166 0 1 467 
Repeat_offender 0.0857 0.2802 0 1 467 
LP_first 0.1349 0.342 0 1 467 
LP_follower 0.439 0.4968 0 1 467 
Legal environment-
related variables           
Fine_guidelines_06 0.3704 0.4834 0 1 467 
Leniency_notice_02 0.531 0.4996 0 1 467 
UK 0.1478 0.3552 0 1 467 
US 0.0985 0.2983 0 1 467 
Appeal success reasons           
Succ_lp 0.1009 0.3026 0 1 109 
Succ_basefine 0.2018 0.4032 0 1 109 
Succ_fine_other 0.1835 0.3889 0 1 109 
Succ_subst 0.3394 0.4757 0 1 109 
Succ_multiple 0.1651 0.373 0 1 109 
Other variables           
Duration_investigation 51.4947 20.0356 7 114 467 
Duration_detection 6.3897 17.2048 -39 55 467 
 
Although it appears dispensable to provide a detailed interpretation of the descriptive statistics 
of all variables shown in Table 1, we would like to point to a few key insights within the six 
categories of variables. First, in terms of appeals-related variables, Table 1 reveals that about 
50 percent of the 467 firm groups decided to file an appeal. Out of this sub-sample of 234 
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firm groups, about 47 percent were successful in the sense of receiving a reduction in the fine 
originally imposed by the EC. In other words, about one quarter of all firm groups convicted 
by the EC successfully appealed and received a fine reduction. On average, the appellants put 
forward about 6 pleas (with 1 and 20 delineating the spectrum) and waited about 49 months 
for a decision on the case. If successful, they received a fine reduction of on average € 8.4 
million. The large majority of more than 90 percent demanded a fine annulment (and a fine 
reduction if the fine annulment was refused by the appellate court). Last but not least, the firm 
groups decided more often to file a second-stage appeal with the ECJ (41 percent of the cases) 
than the EC itself (11 percent of the cases).     
 Turning to the group-specific variables, we find on average 1.9 firms in one group 
stemming from 1.5 countries. There are on average 1.3 leniency applicants among them and 
they have on average about 49,000 employees. Last but not least, the liquid ratio as measure 
for a firm group’s average financial performance is found to lie between 0.08 (worst 
performance) and 55.6 (best performance) with an average of 1.6. 
 The descriptive statistics of the fine-related variables reveal further insights relevant for 
the subsequent empirical analysis. It is shown that both aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances play a minor role in only 4 or 17 percent of all firm groups, respectively. On 
average, a firm group participated about 83 months in a cartel (with 3 and 419 months 
delineating the spectrum) and faced an average fine (imposed by the EC) of about € 31 
million, again within a rather large spectrum from € 0 to € 553 million. About 5 percent of the 
firm groups were ringleaders and about 9 percent show the characteristic of a repeat offender. 
13 percent of all groups in the data set successfully applied for leniency as first applicant 
(regularly receiving full leniency) while further 44 percent successfully received leniency as 
follower (regularly receiving a fine reduction).    
 With respect to the legal environment-related variables, Table 1 reveals that about 37 
percent of all firm groups fall under the revised 2006 EC Guidelines for the Method of Setting 
Fines and about 53 percent under the revised 2002 EC Leniency Notice. About 15 percent of 
the firm groups are based in the UK (compared to 10 percent in the US).    
 Turning to the remaining two categories – appeal success reasons and other variables – it 
is found that substantive reasons are in about 34 percent of all 109 cases of successful appeals 
accepted by the courts followed by about 20 percent for errors in the calculation of the fine. 
Last but not least, the EC needed on average 51 months from the beginning of an 
investigation to its end with 7 months being the shortest duration and 114 months being the 
longest. On average, the investigation started about 6 months after the cartel breakdown, 
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however, with a rather wide spectrum from -39 months (in a case in which the cartel 
continued to operate after the EC started an investigation) up to 55 months after the cartel 
breakdown.   
 
5.3. Estimation results  
In this section, we present the key results of our empirical analysis. Following our research 
questions and the structure of the econometric framework, we begin with a discussion of the 
results for the determinants of appealing against a cartel decision by the EC, followed by a 
detailed characterization of the second research question after the determinants and the size of 
success for those firm groups that decided to file an appeal. In a third step, we will make use 
of the richness of our empirical setting and provide a discussion of our results for those 
variables that appear to play a key role at all stages of the analysis. We will restrict our 
discussion to significant variables only.  
 
5.3.1. Stage 1: Assessing the characteristics of appellants 
The first stage of our empirical analysis focuses on the characteristics of firms who decide to 
file an appeal against a cartel decision by the EC. Guided by the above description of both our 
explanatory variables and the empirical model, we receive the following results for the three 
groups of key variables. Starting with the Probit estimates using the full sample size (first 
column in Table 2), we find for the group of fine-related variables, first, a (weakly) positive 
relationship between the presence of a mitigating factor and the probability to file an appeal 
suggesting that firms are more likely to initiate an appeal if they believe that the expected 
reduction (e.g., due to full cooperation with the EC) was not large enough rather than in the 
opposite direction in which aggravating circumstances might have led to an ‘exaggerated’ 
increase in the fine. Second, we find a highly significant impact of the size of the final fine 
imposed by the EC on the probability to file an appeal confirming our hypothesis that higher 
fines increase the desire to achieve a reduction in the fine through appealing the EC decision. 
Third, our estimations reveal that repeat offenders are more inclined to challenge EC 
decisions than single offenders. The estimated coefficient is highly significant and in 
contradiction to our hypothesis derived above. One possible explanation for the diverging 
result could be seen in possible insider knowledge of repeat offenders in the procedures of the 
EC leading to elevated incentives to initiate an appeal. Alternatively, repeat offenders may be 
left with the impression that the (elevated) fine imposed by the EC was ‘out of scale’ thereby 
motivating an appeal. Fourth, we find a significantly lower probability to appeal for firms that 
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participated in the leniency program. On average, the probability to appeal an EC decision is 
58 percent lower for the first applicants and 23 percent lower for the followers (compared to 
firms that did not apply for leniency) also confirming our hypothesis that the improved 
information situation on the side of the EC causes a reduction in the probability of error and a 
therefore a reduced incentive to initiate an appeal.  
 Turning from the fine-related to the legal environment-related variables, we find, first, that 
firms fined under the revised 2006 EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines have a 
significantly reduced probability to file an appeal compared to firms that were fined under the 
preceding guidelines from 1998. As expected, the evidence is consistent with our allegation 
that the much more detailed fine calculation process defined in the 2006 guidelines increased 
the transparency of EC decisions thereby lowering the incentives to initiate an appeal. Second, 
Table 2 reveals significantly lower appeal probabilities for firms that are located in the UK, 
contradicting our hypothesis that the aim of delaying private enforcement actions may 
motivate firms to file appeals. One explanation for this unexpected outcome can be seen in the 
fact that – according to the UK rules on interest and inflation for cartel damages – the 
damages amount will inevitably increase over time from the occurrence of the loss (i.e., the 
cartel period) onwards rather than the point in time at which the public case is eventually 
closed (see generally Bueren et al. (2014) for a detailed assessment). In other words, delaying 
cartel damage claims in the UK would increase the final damages amount and, as a 
consequence, only firms in financial trouble may have elevated incentives to postpone the 
respective fine payments as far into the future as possible through the filing of an appeal. 15 
                                                          
15  One explanation for the insignificant result of the private enforcement dummy for the US can be seen in the 
lower prominence of follow-on cases, i.e., potentially damaged customers in the US much more often decide 









Table 2: Estimation results for model stage 1  
 Probit (Full sample) Logit (Full sample) Probit (Sub-sample) Logit (Sub-sample) 
Group-related variables        
No_firms 0.0411 (0.98) 0.0419 (0.91) 0.0502 (1.03) 0.0546 (1.01) 
No_countries 0.0691 (1.27) 0.0789 (1.35) 0.0298 (0.48) 0.0251 (0.36) 
No_employees     -0.00160*** (-2.71) -0.00179** (-2.55) 
Liquidratio     -0.0141** (-2.27) -0.0149** (-2.27) 
Fine-related variables        
Aggrav_circum -0.159 (-1.05) -0.167 (-1.09) -0.224 (-1.13) -0.225 (-1.13) 
Mitig_circum 0.178* (1.89) 0.188* (1.87) -0.00947 (-0.07) -0.0229 (-0.14) 
Duration_participation -0.000449 (-0.66) -0.000529 (-0.65) 0.000287 (0.33) 0.000263 (0.26) 
Final_fine 0.00248*** (3.65) 0.00273*** (3.13) 0.00303*** (3.61) 0.00332*** (3.53) 
Ringleader -0.0231 (-0.18) -0.0112 (-0.08) 0.325** (2.41) 0.327** (2.20) 
Repeat_offender 0.307*** (3.67) 0.326*** (3.81) 0.367*** (3.70) 0.367*** (3.39) 
LP_first -0.584*** (-13.89) -0.575*** (-12.37) -0.640*** (-13.29) -0.650*** (-11.55) 
LP_follower -0.225*** (-2.93) -0.236*** (-2.82) -0.366*** (-4.35) -0.404*** (-4.12) 
Legal environment-related variables        
Fine_guidelines_06 -0.539*** (-6.79) -0.545*** (-6.69) -0.697*** (-7.71) -0.719*** (-7.52) 
Leniency_notice_02 -0.100 (-0.97) -0.112 (-0.98) -0.0919 (-0.59) -0.0835 (-0.43) 
UK -0.246*** (-4.03) -0.249*** (-3.92) -0.268*** (-2.86) -0.276*** (-2.63) 
US 0.0241 (0.26) 0.0236 (0.23) 0.184 (1.35) 0.190 (1.25) 
N 467 467 272 272 
Pseudo R2 0.3373 0.3352 0.5114 0.5074 






Turning from the legal environment to group-related variables, none of the two variables 
(No_firms, No_countries) included in all estimations show a significant impact. However, 
applying the Probit model to the smaller sample (column 3 in Table 2) of firm groups for 
which two further variables are available (No_employees, Liquidratio) reveal that both 
additional variables significantly influence the probability to file an appeal. Contradictory to 
our hypothesis derived in Section 3 above, the number of employees is found to have a 
significantly negative effect on the probability to file an appeal; i.e., larger firms have a 
reduced incentive to appeal against a cartel decision by the EC. Possible explanations can be 
seen either in the desire of the respective larger firms to end the case (and with it the negative 
publicity for the firm as well as the resource-intensive internal investigation period) or the 
simple fact that larger firms have better possibilities to cope with (even larger) fines. The 
second key variable – the liquid ratio as measure of a group’s financial performance – 
however, shows the expected significantly negative effect, confirming our hypothesis that 
firms in financial trouble have a higher probability to file an appeal – possibly for the tactical 
reason of delaying fine payments – than firms in better financial condition.       
 Comparing the remaining variables that are included in both estimations (i.e., full sample 
and sub-sample), Table 2 reveals that with the exception of one variable (Mitig_circ) all 
significant variables in the full sample estimation turn out to be significant (and have the same 
direction) in the sub-sample estimation. Furthermore, a comparison of the results of the Probit 
and Logit estimations also show identical significance and direction characteristics leaving 
only the size of the coefficients differing marginally. We can therefore conclude that our 
results are not driven by the underlying functional form of the discrete choice models thereby 
supporting their robustness. 
 
5.3.2. Stage 2: Assessing the characteristics of successful appellants 
The second stage of our empirical analysis focuses on the determinants of successful appeals 
in connection to the level of success. Guided by the description of both our explanatory 
variables and the empirical model above, we receive the following results for the two groups 
of key variables (referring to the results of the superior two-stage hurdle model only). Starting 
with the variables affecting the appellant’s success probability in connection to the level of 
success, we find that, first, the number of different reasons raised by a group in an appeal has 
– as expected – a highly significant positive effect on the probability of a successful appeal; 
however, the number of reasons raised does not influence the size of the fine reduction 
granted. Second, we find that an increasing number of leniency applicants significantly reduce 
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the probability of a successful appeal thereby confirming our hypothesis derived above. 
Interestingly, however, if the appeal is found to be nevertheless successful, the number of 
leniency applicants has a positive effect on the level of fine reduction granted (suggesting that 
if an error occurs it is of severer nature thereby justifying larger fine reductions). Third, in 
terms of second-stage appeals, the respective coefficients reported in Table 3 reveal that the 
probability for a successful appeal increases substantially if the EC appealed against the first-
stage appellate court decision while the corresponding probability decreases if the firm 
appealed the GC decision thereby supporting our hypothesis derived above. 
 Fourth, with respect to the time span between cartel breakdown and beginning of 
investigation our results show that the probability of a successful appeal is reduced with an 
increase in the period until detection. This result stands in contradiction to our hypothesis 
derived above arguing that such older cases are more difficult to handle by the EC and 
consequently leave more room for a successful appeal.       
 Turning to the variables affecting the appellant’s level of success only, Table 3 reveals 
that, first, firm groups that demand a fine annulment receive larger fine discounts than firm 
groups that only appeal for a fine reduction supporting our hypothesis that the former case 
type is likely to have more substance. Second, our estimation results also provide strong 
support for our hypothesis that the higher the final fine, the larger the absolute fine reduction 
as part of an appeals process. Third, we also find strong support for both ringleaders and 
repeat offenders receiving larger fine reductions than firms without those two characteristics. 
This finding contradicts with our hypothesis derived above, however, may be explained – at 
least for repeat offenders – by the presence of insider knowledge that allows the realization of 
larger fine reductions.16 Alternatively, the EC may have decided to impose very large fines for 
both ringleaders and repeat offenders (for deterrence purposes) which were later found to be 
incompatible with EC competition law by the appellate court (and consistently reduced 
substantially). Last but not least, the different appeal success reasons show partly diverging 
results. While all coefficients are found to be significant, only the presence of ‘substantive 
reasons’ is found to result in a higher level of the fine reduction (relative to the reference 
group ‘error in the calculation of the basic amount of the fine’) while the remaining three 
reasons (error in the application of leniency notice, error in the fine calculation process, or 
multiple reasons) result in (comparably small but) lower fine reductions compared to the 
reference group.             
                                                          
16  Please note that a higher final fine for both ringleaders and repeat offenders (due to the presence of 
aggravating factors) cannot explain the size and significance of the two coefficients as we separately control 







Table 3: Estimation results for models stages 2a and 2b 
  Hurdle model (stage 2a) 
߲ܲሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0|࢞૚ሻ/߲ݔ௝ 
Hurdle model (stage 2b) Tobit model Tobit model 
  
߲ܧሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ|ܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0, ࢞૛ሻ/߲ݔ௝ ߲ܲሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0|࢞ሻ/߲ݔ௝ 
 
߲ܧሺܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ|ܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ൐ 0, ࢞ሻ/߲ݔ௝ 
No_pleas 0.0399*** (3.38) -0.0177 (-0.10) 0.0249** (2.06) 0.5297* (1.95) 
No_appellants 0.0666 (1.45) -0.2750 (-0.51) -0.0028 (-0.08) -0.0598 (-0.08) 
No_leniency_applicants -0.0656* (-1.76) 0.993** (2.29) -0.0232 (-0.49) -0.4925 (-0.5) 
Twostages_ec 0.546*** (10.18) 0.071 (0.47) 1.5525 (0.46) 
Twostages_firmgroup -0.133* (-1.72) -0.1663*** (-2.6) -3.5295** (-2.43) 
Duration_investigation 0.00192 (1.02) 0.002 (1.26) 0.0425 (1.2) 
Duration_detection -0.00413* (-1.68) -0.0066*** (-2.88) -0.1396*** (-2.85) 
Fine_guidelines_06 -0.0969 (-0.77) 1.8370 (0.75) 0.1335 (0.91) 2.9831 (0.82) 
Leniency_notice_02 -0.145 (-1.57) 0.8760 (0.52) -0.1067 (-1.29) -2.2578 (-1.28) 
Fine_anulment   4.945*** (3.59) 0.1048 (0.89) 2.1648 (0.91) 
Final_fine   0.0627*** (4.89) 0.005*** (5.13) 0.1057*** (5.92) 
Ringleader   6.269** (2.16) -0.0342 (-0.3) -0.7189 (-0.3) 
Repeat_offender   4.533** (2.04) 0.0031 (0.03) 0.0650 (0.03) 
Succ_subst   8.621* (1.83)   
Succ_lp   -2.459* (-1.80)   
Succ_fineother   -3.924*** (-3.19)   
Succ_multiple     -2.646* (-1.75)         
N 234 109 234 234 






Before we turn to a discussion of several implications of our entire empirical analysis and 
results for public policy makers, it is important from a methodological perspective to point to 
especially two advantages of the two-stage hurdle model compared to the Tobit model. First, 
as shown by the ‘number of leniency applicants’ variable, the hurdle model allows for 
differences in the sign of coefficients between both stages while the simple Tobit model is 
unable to take these important differences into account. Second, a direct comparison of the 
results of the hurdle model with the Tobit model reveals substantial differences in the sign, 
the size and the significance of the coefficients. Last but not least, Green (2003) proposes to 
test the hurdle model against the Tobit model by using the log-likelihood values of the Tobit, 
the Probit and the truncated regressions. Applying this test to our data clearly prefers the 
hurdle model over the Tobit model.   
 
5.4. Implications for firms and public policy makers 
Based on the description of our empirical results in the preceding section, we will now turn to 
a discussion of implications for both firms and public policy makers. Instead of providing a 
full assessment addressing all (significant) variables on the two stages of the empirical model, 
we will rather concentrate on a more detailed discussion of several important topical areas. 
 Assuming that a firm as rational decision maker decides to file an appeal as long as the net 
present value of the investment is positive, the question is posed how our empirical results 
help in conducting the necessary assessment of both the probability of success and the level of 
success (i.e., the level of fine reduction granted). With respect to the former, we find that 
firms can positively influence the probability of success by increasing the number of reasons 
for appeal raised (and substantiated) in the official documents. Furthermore, our empirical 
results also help in identifying situations in which the probability of a successful appeal is 
significantly reduced. This is especially the case with an increasing number of leniency 
applicants (within a certain cartel case) and after the EC has won the first-stage appellate 
court trial with the GC.      
 In terms of drivers of the level of success of an appeal, our results suggest that, first, the 
level of success depends on the type(s) of reason(s) accepted by the court to justify the appeal. 
In particular, we find that ‘substantive reasons’ and ‘errors in the calculation of the basic 
amount of the fine’ lead to the largest fine reductions while all other reasons and especially 
the assertion of multiple reasons are less successful. Second, our results suggest that both 
ringleaders and repeat offenders are encouraged to initiate appeals as they can expect – if 
successful – larger fine reductions. Third, when filing an appeal, firms are well advised to 
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demand a fine annulment as this characteristic is likely to increase the level of fine reduction 
later on. Last but not least, our empirical results also suggest that the level of success 
increases with the size of the final fine imposed by the EC or GC (making an appeal 
increasingly attractive).  
 Turning to the implications of our results for public policy makers, we can, first, say that 
our finding of a significantly reduced probability to file an appeal after the introduction of the 
EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines in 2006 is consistent with the hypothesis that 
this clarification of the respective rules and regulations increased the transparency of EC 
fining decisions and correspondingly reduced the desire of firms to initiate (eventually 
unjustified and costly) appeals. As a consequence, it appears likely that further increases in 
transparency have the potential to further improve the efficiency of the appeals process. This 
may especially be the case for a clarification of the role of mitigating circumstances (as our 
empirical analysis revealed that firms decide to file an appeal with a higher probability as 
soon as mitigating circumstances play a role).  
 Second, our result that firms that decided to participate in the EC leniency program had a 
significantly lower probability to file an appeal suggests that such forms of cooperation 
between the authority and the respective firms increase the mutual understanding of the 
positions of both sides and therefore leads to a significant reduction in the number of 
(unnecessary and therefore inefficient) appeals. As the effect is found to be much stronger for 
the first reporting firm compared to the runner-up reporting firms – basically because only the 
first reporting firm is likely to receive a fine waiver – possible reforms could think about ways 
to further increase the number of firms that participate in the EC leniency program thereby 
reducing the number of unnecessary appeals further. However, it is important in this respect 
to remind that large fines for breaches of the anti-cartel laws are important for the creation of 
a (sufficiently large) deterrence effect. In other words, while larger fine reductions for (more) 
runner-up firms are likely to reduce the number of appeals further, the societal costs created 
by the corresponding weakening of the deterrence effect (due to the lower expected fine 
payments) may be substantial (possibly overcompensating the savings in the appeals process). 
 Third, our finding that firms in financial trouble are more likely to file an appeal suggests 
that tactical reasons – rather than the true belief that the respective EC decision was erroneous 
– may motivate the filing of appeals. Although such cases are likely to reduce efficiency, the 
apparent difficulty to clearly differentiate (ex-ante) between legitimate claims and frivolous 
claims suggests that it may be in the interest of society to accept a certain amount of 
(inefficient) frivolous claims rather than to take the risk of discouraging firms with legitimate 
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reasons to file an appeal. However, if it is found – e.g., after the establishment of private 
antitrust enforcement in Europe in the coming years – that the number of appeals is increasing 
substantially, additional measures to reduce the number of potentially frivolous appeals may 
become desirable. In this respect, it would not even be necessary to implement changes in the 
appeals process as such but rather to change the incentives of firms to file an appeal for 
tactical reasons only. In particular, if interest has to be paid from the time of the occurrence of 
the loss (as currently the case, e.g., in the UK and Germany) rather than the final decision in 
the public investigation of the cartel case (as currently the case, e.g., in France), the incentives 
to file appeals only for the sake of postponing damages payments would be reduced 
substantially.      
 Last but not least, our results also reveal that both repeat offenders and ringleaders not only 
have elevated incentives to initiate an appeal but also receive larger fine discounts if their 
appeal turns out to be successful. Given the fact that both characteristics are clearly negative 
and the EC consequently has announced (and implemented) a very strict enforcement policy 
against such firms, on the surface, it appears questionable why the appellate courts 
subsequently reduce the fines imposed substantially (thereby weakening the deterrence 
effect). However, given that the appellate courts are committed to review the case with 
respect to the correct application of existing laws and regulations, it appears likely that the 
large (and further elevated) fines imposed by the EC for both ringleaders and repeat offenders 
were incompatible with EC competition law and therefore had to be reduced by the appellate 
court(s). As a consequence, our results suggest a revision of the definition and role of 
aggravating factors (including especially ringleaders and repeat offenders) as part of the fine 
calculation process in order to allow a severer punishment of firms with those characteristics 
thereby strengthening both the efficiency of the appeals process and the deterrence effect of 
anti-cartel law enforcement.    
 
6. Conclusion 
The appeals process is an important mechanism to correct erroneous decisions and to improve 
existing laws and regulations. Although the law and economics literature often relates appeals 
processes to decisions by lower courts reassessed by higher courts, the mechanism as such 
plays a much wider role as indispensable part of decision making processes in various types 
of organizations such religious bodies, commercial trade organizations or professional sports 
leagues. In fact, the long-lasting existence of all these organizations is closely tied to 
convincing answers to the question how disputes are handled and resolved – with workable 
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appeals processes regularly representing an important cornerstone in the overarching 
organizational and governance structures.        
 Although a suitable design of appeals processes is an important precondition for achieving 
their intended goals, the consistent implementation of the respective concepts into practice is 
of at least equal importance. Even the most advanced theoretical ideas and concepts on the 
design of appeals processes remain meaningless ‘paper tigers’ if they are not implemented (or 
implementable) in an effective and efficient fashion considering, e.g., the availability of 
sufficient financial resources in general or the appointment of experienced and reputable 
officials who are entrusted with the power to act as decision makers in particular. As a 
consequence, an overarching and sustainable design and implementation of appeals processes 
is committed to combine elaborate theoretical thinking with empirical studies that aim at 
investigating, e.g., key characteristics of (successful) appellants resulting not only in 
conclusions on the workability and efficiency of certain implemented appeals processes but 
also allowing to develop options for further improvement.      
 Against this background, we use data of 467 firm groups that participated in 88 cartels 
convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to study both the 
characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and the factors that determine their 
successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying discrete choice models and a two-stage 
hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics – such as the size and financial 
condition of the firm group or the clarity of fine guidelines – only affect the probability to file 
an appeal, other factors such as the size of the fine imposed in connection to characteristics as 
ringleader, repeat offender or leniency applicant influence both the probability and the success 
of an appeal.  
 Based on our empirical results, we are able to derive several important conclusions for 
both firms and public policy makers. From a firm perspective, our results not only suggest 
that firms can positively influence the probability of success by increasing the number of 
reasons for appeal but also allowed the conclusion that the probability of success is reduced 
with an increasing number of leniency applicants and after the EC has won the first-stage 
appellate court trial. Furthermore, the level of success is found to be influenced by, e.g., the 
type(s) of reason(s) accepted by the courts to justify the appeal or the characteristic as either 
ringleader or repeat offender. Generally, the consideration of all these different drivers 
supports firms in an overarching assessment of the expected gains and losses of filing an 
appeal and therefore facilitate a rational decision whether to invest into such a project or not.  
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 From a public policy perspective, our results suggest that an increase in the transparency of 
administrative or judicial decisions – through a publication of clear guidelines – can reduce 
the number of unnecessary and inefficient appeals substantially. A similar effect can be 
expected if certain forms of cooperation between a public authority and the respective firms 
are implemented (e.g., through a leniency program) that promote the mutual understanding of 
the position of the other side (and include some commitment to reduce the imminent fine). 
Furthermore, although we only find limited support for the current existence of frivolous 
appeals, i.e., appeals that are filed for tactical purposes only, the rising importance of private 
enforcement in Europe demands regular reassessments of the situation in order to avoid 
possible decreases in the efficiency of the appeals process through an increased proportion of 
inefficient tactical appeals (to, e.g., postpone damages payment into the distant future). Last 
but not least, a consequent implementation of the deterrence approach in European 
competition law demands that both ringleaders and repeat offenders are punished more 
severely than other cartel members or first-time offenders. In this respect, our finding that 
European appellate courts had to grant higher fine reductions to both groups appears 
counterproductive and suggests a revision of the definition and role of aggravating factors 
(including especially ringleaders and repeat offenders) as part of the fine calculation process.  
 Our empirical results together with the derived policy implications suggest several avenues 
for future research. One interesting area in this respect is field studies within both appellate 
courts and firms. While the aim of the former type of field study would be to learn more about 
the practical side of the appeals process with its various challenges and constraints, field 
studies within firms would especially allow to acquire a deeper understanding of the true 
motivations behind the decision to file an appeal (reaching from the true belief that the 
decision of the EC was erroneous via an attempt to receive some degree of fine reduction up 
to the filing of frivolous appeals). Both types of studies are likely to subsequently allow the 
inclusion of further variables (possibly) reaching an even better explanatory value of an 
empirical analysis.  
 Another fruitful area of future research is international comparisons of differently 
structured – but topic-wise similar – appeals processes. Although it is obvious that legislative 
(and related) differences across countries will complicate such an endeavor, benchmarking 
exercises would still enable efficiency comparisons and would therefore allow basing policy 
conclusions on more robust foundations. A third and last promising area of future research is 
to complement our study of one specific appeals process with comparable studies focusing on 
different appeals processes in other areas of law (or within organizations). Given the fact that 
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the theoretical literature has identified an ample number of different options to structure 
appeals processes (all with specific advantages and disadvantages), further empirical studies 
would certainly help to understand their corresponding effects after being implemented in 
practice – and would subsequently facilitate constant improvements of the workability and 
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Table 4: Variables in the data set 
Variable Description 
Appeals-related 
 variables   
Appeal =1 if group brought an appeal against the EC decision before the GC 
Appeal_success =1 if group received a fine reduction due to appeal 
No_pleas Number of pleas put forward in the appeal 
No_appellants Number of appellants within group 
Duration_decision Duration of appeal decision, in months 
Discount Discount granted due to appeal 
Fine_annulment =1 if group strived for an annulment of the fine rather than for a fine reduction 
Twostage_ec =1 if the appeal decision is challenged by the EC before the ECJ 
Twostage_firmgroup =1 if the appeal decision is challenged by the group before the ECJ 
Group-related  
variables   
No_firms Number of firms within group 
No_countries Number of different countries within group 
No_len_applicants Number of leniency applicants within group 
No_employees Number of employees of group, in thousands 
Liquidratio Liquid ratio (=liquid assets/short-term liabilities) in the year of the EC decision 
Fine-related variables   
Aggrav_circum =1 if aggravating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
Mitig_circum =1 if mitigating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
Duration_participation Duration of cartel participation by the group, in months 
Final_Fine Final fine imposed by the EC 
Ringleader =1 if group was ringleader in the cartel 
Repeat_offender =1 if group is a repeat offender 
LP_first =1 if group successfully applied for leniency and was the first applicant 
LP_follower =1 if group successfully applied for leniency and was not the first applicant 
Legal environment- 
related variables   
Fine_guidelines_06 =1 if the EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines from 2006 were applied 
Leniency_notice_02 =1 if the EC Leniency Notice from 2002 was applied 
UK =1 if group is located in the UK 
US =1 if group is located in the US 
Appeal success reasons   
Succ_lp =1 if GC/ECJ accepted appeal due to an error in the application of the leniency notice 
Succ_basefine =1 if GC/ECJ accepted appeal due to an error in the calculation of the basic amount of the fine 
Succ_fine_other =1 if GC/ECJ accepted appeal due to an error in the fine calculation process after basic amount of the fine was set 
Succ_subst =1 if GC/ECJ accepted appeal due to substantive reasons 
Succ_multiple =1 if GC/ECJ accepted appeal due to several reasons 
Other variables   
Duration_investigation Time span between begin and end of investigation by the EC, in months 
Duration_detection Time span between cartel breakdown and begin of investigation, in months 
 
